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PROF. BARCEL6: We will start with a discussion of Mr.
Spence's paper on the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) of
Canada. The two panelists on my left, Professor Bischel of the Syracuse College of Law, and Mr. William Connell, Assistant General
Counsel in the Legal Department of the Irving Trust Company, will
address their remarks to Mr. Spence's paper, after which Mr.
Spence may choose to reply. Thereafter, I have some comments to
make about Mr. Gadbaw's paper on the trade law affecting U.S.Canadian trade, after which Mr. Gadbaw may wish to make some
comments. Then we'll open the discussion to the audience. Let me
turn then to Mr. Connell for comments on Mr. Spence's paper.
MR. CONNELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If my comments
aren't too specialized, I thought I would try to give you the structure
of the legal department of an international bank, particularly what
we call a wholesale bank, as opposed to a retail bank. We deal
mainly with corporations, especially banks, in specialized international areas. We have a nine-man legal department, and we do
specialize. For instance, I specialize in Irving Trust's international
investments, and in its acquisitions abroad. About two years ago,
the chairman of the bank expressed an interest in expanding into
Canada, and he wanted to go in as quickly and as expeditiously as
possible. Of course, the chairman of any major bank or any major
company hires his lawyers, and they go out and find out how it can
be done. The chairman was not aware of, and I'll admit I was not
aware of, the Foreign Investment Review Act. But we soon came
upon it, and we realized that after many years of unrestricted opera* John J . Barcelo III is Associate Professor of Law and Director of International Legal
Studies, Cornell Law School.
William Connell is Assistant General Counsel for the Irving Trust Company.
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tions in Canada, things were changing. I think it should be noted
that 200 U.S. banks operate in Canada, perhaps not all strictly as
banks, but operating in Canada just the same, be it in a leasing
company operation, merchant banking, finance companies, or other
categories of activity. Canada has been very generous to the United
States in that regard.
In the United States, on the other hand, and particularly in
New York, branches and agencies of Canadian banks are under
pretty tight regulation and supervision. There is not, however, national regulation of foreign banks in the United States.
So, with due deference to Canada's generosity over the years,
we thought we would just plow ahead and invest, and set up a
finance company in Ontario. We quickly found that we had to consider the impending Foreign Investment Review Act, and we didn't
feel we could implement our plans early enough to establish this de
novo, from the ground up, operation. We felt we couldn't establish
it without going through the Review Board or the review process.
After some consideration, we found one aspect of the law that was
most vague. I refer to the "substantial benefit" test: will the proposed investment result in tangible benefits to the Canadian economy. We could not find any criteria or guidelines for further defining
the test.
There were two legal issues that we found most interesting, and
I might ask Jim Spence to comment on these in a little more depth.
First were the comments on "expanding the business." I think the
law is not quite clear on whether or not a business, once established,
would have to present a new product line, or expanded activity, to
the Board for review. Second, we found enough vagaries there,
frankly Jim, so that we were very disappointed; we didn't think the
tests were quite as explicit as we would have liked to have seen.
Another point, which didn't relate to Irving Trust as much, was
this concept, which we found to be unique, best illustrated by an
example: suppose General Motors decides to sell the shares of a
company that it owns to IBM, and the company that GM sells has
an affiliate or subsidiary in Canada. That means that the entire
acquisition program, which would really be a U.S. acquisition, GMIBM, would be subject to review in Canada. We found this ultimate
form of long-arm jurisdiction to be most interesting and perplexing.
Those are the two areas of the law, and I'll go back to the first
and ask if you've had any specific problems lately on the expansion
into new areas. Have you developed any further tests, or have there
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been any rumblings in Canada challenging your apparent authority
to review expanded operations and new products, yet with no substantial guidelines, or are you developing new guidelines?
MR. SPENCE: On that point, guidelines were issued on the question of what constitutes a related business, and I can go back over
the grounds for this. The rule in the Act relating to new businesses
is that where a new business is established by foreign investors, that
business is reviewable under the Act, unless it is related to a business which the foreign investor already has in Canada. 1 The question then of course becomes: on what basis can you establish relatedness between two businesses? The Act doesn't define this, and
guidelines were issued to deal with this problem. That was done,
first of all, by way of preliminary guidelines which were very brief.
Four or five principles were itemized, and it was proposed that they
be formulated in greater detail. Those more extensive guidelines
were in fact published at the time that the second phase of the Act,
dealing with new businesses, was announced. I believe the date of
their publication was July 18 of last summer [1975].
MR. CONNELL: So, it wasn't in October, it was before October?
MR. SPENCE: They were published in advance, so that people
could familiarize themselves with the rules before the actual effective date. Those guidelines are in effect now.
The comments you made about problems of vagueness, with
the concept of relatedness, may still apply, even though we have
replaced one page of text with something like seven or eight. What
we've tried to do is to elaborate on each of the principles that I
mentioned briefly, to give some examples of the kinds of things that
we think are contemplated by the principles, and also to indicate
some quantitative relationships between the existing business and
the new business, which assist in assuring that the businesses are
really related in a quantitative way.
To take an extreme example, we are faced with the problem of
the investor who goes from a peanut stand to a national confectionary enterprise. They may be related in terms of product, but the
scale of the operations may be so absolutely disproportionate that
to the ordinary observer it's hard to believe that those are really
related undertakings. So we had to try to devise some quantitative
relationships, but in a very rough and general way. We weren't
trying to lock people into exact numbers, so, for example, we stated
1. Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat. c. 46, § 8(2) (1973) .

Published by SURFACE, 1977

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1977], Art. 5

358

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 4:355

that the new operation should ordinarily not be more than twice the
size of the established operation, and the rule was stated in such
rough terms that people could see that it was only kind of a pointer,
and not an exact restriction. Even with the more detailed guidelines
that we have, there are areas of vagueness within them. We felt that
it was important to leave those areas of vagueness to avoid putting
an inappropriate and unduly restrictive test upon business expansion. The general comment that has been made about the guidelines
as they were finally published has been that they are relatively open
guidelines. They have been commended by some sources for that,
and they have been criticized by other sources.
MR. CONNELL: Jim, could I for a moment focus on an issue
that came up when we did think of going into Ontario, which may
be of interest to the lawyers in our federal system? Our lawyer in
Ontario said, "Well, you know there is an argument that this is a
federal law which is being administered, but we are the provinces,
with some of the old States' rights arguments, and we think that
this whole Act may be unconstitutional because 'acquisition of
property' should be left, perhaps by Canadian precedent, to provincial determination. It is an item that the federal government would
be preempted or excluded from legislating about." Now that was
bandied around, I recall, in a meeting. Have there been similar
arguments raised in the provinces, and do they have any substance?
MR. SPENCE: At least one provincial Prime Minister, Mr. Hatfield of New Brunswick, has said, in effect, that if we try to lay our
hands on any deal that's going on in New Brunswick, he'll have us
in the Supreme Court of Canada in a flash. I don't think there has
been occasion to join issue with him yet, but I think that is the
position he has consistently taken.
The provincial argument, I believe, is essentially that under the
British North America Act (the Canadian constitution) matters of
property and civil rights are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
provinces, 2 and accordingly, the federal government is trenching
upon provincial jurisdiction with this legislation. The argument
from the federal point of view is likely to be founded on two principles. First of all, the British North America Act contemplates that
the federal government may legislate for "the peace, order, and good
government" of the country. 3 That is a power which has been exer2. British North America Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, § -92(13) .
3. Id. § 91. For the purposes of this discussion, the following language of Section 91 is of
interest:
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cised on occasion, and which has had a rather stormy career in the
Supreme Court. Clearly, the legislators or the draftsmen were at
some pains to avail themselves of the potential argument under that
clause, because the stated purpose of the Act indicates that the
difficulties created by foreign investment are considered to be a
matter of national concern. I see that as an effort to move towards,
or bootstrap into, a "peace, order, and good government" argument.
As well, I think there is a clear federal power over matters concerning aliens, and there would be an argument that investment subject
to foreign control could come within the power to legislate in regard
to aliens.
MR. CONNELL: Wasn't the Canada Corporations Act 4 restructured about two years ago, so that there is now a requirement that
a majority or even all of the directors of a company in Canada be
Canadian citizens? This is a subject that also came to our attention.
We said, "Where are we going to get the Canadian citizens to be our
employees, to be the directors or the managers of our business in
Ontario?" We went through some last minute deliberations and
decided that a voting trust, with directors who would be citizens of
Canada, could be used. Is this a new requirement in your law?
MR. SPENCE: Every province has its own corporations act
which deals with the incorporation of companies within that jurisdiction and prescribes rules, such as this kind of rule. 5 This kind of
rule is fairly novel in each of the provinces. As well, the federal
government has legislation enabling the incorporation of companies
under the federal jurisdiction. 6 It also has requirements for Canadian membership on the board of directors. 7 I don't think I can give
you a rundown on each of the provinces, but I think that the direction in which all of the provinces and the federal government have
been moving in their legislation is to require that a majority of the
board of directors be Canadians, and in the case of public corporations, that the Canadians be outsiders. 8
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
and House of Commons, to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of
Canada . . . . [T]he exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada
extends to all matters coming within the classes of subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-. . . . 2. The regulation of trade and commerce.
4. Canada Corporations Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-32 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Ontario Business Corporations Act, ONT. R.Ev. STAT. c. 53, § 3 (1970).
6. Canada Corporations Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-32, §§ 5, 7 (1970).
7. Canada Business Corporations Act, Can. Stat. c. 33, § 100(3) (1975).
8. Id. § 97(2).
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As well, the Canadian legislation, both federal and provincial,
has been moving in the direction of taking more seriously the responsibility of directors. It used to be said that so long as you stayed
away, you couldn't be held liable. It looks now as if you'd better be
there, and if you don't like what's going on you'd better say so. You
can say it politely, but you'd better speak up in some way. I suppose
this parallel development of a more serious responsibility cast upon
the directors rather compounds the difficulty. I think that lawyers
in private practice in Canada are well aware of the difficulty that
foreign investors encounter with this. There is a real difficulty in
finding appropriate people to have on the board of directors-qualified, experienced people who can be relied upon to serve
the interests of the company.
QUESTION (Prof. Goldie): I'd like to ask Mr. Spence a question. The constitutionality issue is very interesting. It seems to me
that the older interpretation of Section 92 of the British North
America Act, the property and civil rights clause, lends more weight
to retaining a residual power in the provinces than in the nation. For
nearly a century, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ignored the power of general legislation-"peace, order, and good government" -and looked to the example clause in the grant to the
nation. 9 Have things changed since the Privy Council appeal was
abolished, 10 so that there is now seen what MacDonald and the
draftsmen really wanted, a powerful central authority, not a vitiated one, as reinterpreted by the Judicial Committee? Second,
have you thought about litigation from your States' righters, on the
East Coast or the West, and I would have thought that the West
Coast would be more independent-minded even than the East
Coast, and that you might have a rather uncomfortable case postured by your opponent plaintiffs? Why not go into the Supreme
Court for an advisory opinion and choose your own grounds?
MR. SPENCE: On the first point, I don't think I could say that
things have really changed since appeals to the Judicial Committee
were abolished, which was in 1949. I suppose it might be more
appropriate to say simply that where there's life, there's hope, and
9. The example clause refers to the following language in Section 91 of the British North
America Act: "[T)he exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament in Canada extends to
all matters coming within the [31] classes of subjects next herein-after enumerated . . . ."
10. In civil matters, Privy Council appeals were abolished by the Supreme Court Act
1949, CAN. R.Ev. STAT. c. S-19, §§ 3, 54(2) (1970).
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jurisprudence can be an evolving thing. I do not know how clear and
definite a position was taken on the constitutional matter at the
time the Act was introduced. As I say, I perceive there to be an effort
to take advantage of whatever argument is available on the "peace,
order, and good government" power. Secondly, on the question of
choosing your grounds, I'll take the suggestion back with me.
MR. CONNELL: Could I jump in here for a moment? Although
I'm perhaps eight years behind on U.S. constitutional law and
standing, I wonder if in Canada one can get what one might call an
advisory opinion from the Supreme Court?
MR. SPENCE: I thought you couldn't, but the federal government is presently making an application to the Supreme Court of
Canada for a decision on whether the current anti-inflation program
in Canada is constitutional. 11 There were indications that various
interest groups might challenge the constitutionality of that program, and it was felt that that possibility was such an important
aspect of the effectiveness of the program that the government
should move as quickly as possible to bring the matter into the
Supreme Court for a resolution. I believe that's underway now. I'm
looking at Mr. Clark. I don't know whether he wants to correct what
I have said. I think I've got it right; I'm only relying on what I've
read in the newspapers, so you never know.
MR. CLARK: You are right. It's not a traditional means of proceeding in Canada, but there certainly exists the possibility of seeking advisory opinions, and I would suspect that we're going to see
more of that approach in the future.
PROF. BARCEL6: I think it would be appropriate now for us to
turn to Professor Bischel for his comments on the problems posed
by the Foreign Investment Review Act.
PROF. BISCHEL: Thank you, John. Being primarily a tax man,
instead of an investment professor as such, let me see if I can't
interrelate some of the tax aspects of this and ask you a few questions with respect to this interrelationship. Along with FIRA, or I
should say perhaps prior to it in 1972 and again in 1973, the Canadian tax system was changed rather radically, especially with regard
to the operation of multinational corporations which were based in

11. Imposition of the anti-inflation program was subsequently held to be constitutional
on the grounds that "peace, order, and good government" justified this intrusion into an area
normally reserved for the provinces, Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, (1976] 68 D.L.R.3d
452.
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Canada. 12 From the not-too-distant perspective of the United
States, my view of the Canadian tax reform was always something
like that of the attorney who wanted to see that his son was welleducated. He sent hiin abroad to learn British diplomacy, American
know-how, and French cuisine. Much to his dismay, his son came
back, and he had learned American diplomacy, French know-how,
and British cuisine.
MR. SPENCE: May I interject. You know there is a variation on
that, as to what Canada expected and what it got. At the outset,
Canada might have expected to have British-style government,
French culture, and American know-how; what it got was French
government, British know-how, and American culture.
PROF. BISCHEL: With respect to the foreign taxing system in
Canada, what the Canadians did in 1972 was to inject a concept,
an anachronism known as F API, which stands for Foreign Accrual
Property Income, which, with subsequent modifications, was more
or less a counterpart to Subpart F in our own Internal Revenue
Code. 13 It operated a bit differently in several respects, and one of
the things that created a problem was that it imputed income back
to a Canadian-based corporation, regardless of whether or not a
dividend distribution had occurred, in several rather unusual types
of circumstances. 14
For instance, assume you've set up a foreign-based licensing
corporation, which is not an unusual thing to do, and further assume
you put it in the Netherlands Antilles. The licensing company is of
course owned by a Canadian parent corporation. Let's also assume
a licensing subsidiary has purchased patent or know-how rights
from an Australian subsidiary and has licensed them to a British
subsidiary. Under the original 1972 Tax Act, that would have triggered, because of the definition of foreign accrual property income, 15
a dividend to the Canadian corporation, regardless of whether or not
a dividend was in fact distributed to it.
Another example with respect to intercorporate dividends is the
situation in which Canada does not have a tax treaty with another
12. An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, Can. Stat. c. 63, §§ 90-95, 115-16, 133-34,
190-91, 212-19 (1972); An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, Can. Stat. c. 14, §§ 29, 37-38,
42-43, 68 (1973); An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act (No. 3), Can. Stat. c. 30, §§ 13, 2527 (1973).
13. An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, Can. Stat. c. 63, § 95 (1972).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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nation, such as Switzerland. Let's assume you had an operating
company in Switzerland, once again owned by a Canadian corporation. The withholding tax on that type of operation would be 30
percent, if in fact you were going to pay a dividend directly to the
Canadian corporation. 16 So it was not unusual to run the dividend
indirectly to Canada through a Dutch holding company for in'"
stance, because Canada and the Netherlands have a treaty exempting the dividend from withholding tax, 17 and Switzerland and the
Netherlands have a similar treaty.1 8 As a matter of fact, what you
could have is a dividend straight on through to the Canadian corporation with no withholding tax at all. The FAPI concept, in essence,
said as soon as you pay the dividend from the Swiss corporation to
the Dutch holding company, you had a deemed dividend distribution to the Canadian corporation. This created quite a problem as
well, with respect to dividend deferral. The net effect of all of this
was that after the 1972 Tax Act was passed, in the two years before
these particular provisions were to become effective, which I believe
was in 1975, a number of multinational corporations took a very
close look at Canada as a base of operations and decided to pack
their bags, or certainly not to expand operations. As a consequence
of that, in 1975, the Canadian tax law was changed once again to
remove some of these provisions, especially the two I spoke about~
and one or two more with regard to insurance companies.1 9
What I'm wondering is whether, in light of actual pressure with
respect to the Foreign Investment Review Act, the Canadian
government finds that there is a significant decrease in investment in Canada, and whetherthere will be some serious reconsideration of the features which discourage investment and thereby depress certain areas in the Canadian economy? In other words, will
similar pressure perhaps be successful in that regard?
MR. SPENCE: I think your question really is whether the Foreign Investment Review Act is subject to the same kinds of pressures
as have been brought to bear on taxes. My impression is that the
16. Id. §§ 212, 215.
17. Convention between the Netherlands and Canada for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, done April 2, 1957,
arts. IV(5), VII, 285 U.N.T.S. 193 (effective Dec. 19, 1957).
18. Agreement between the Netherlands and Switzerland for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and Property, done Nov. 12, 1951, art. 9, ad art.
9, 126 U.N.T.S. 173 (effective Jan. 9, 1952).
19. An Act to Amend the Statute Law Relating to Income Tax, Can. Stat. c. 26, § 59
(1975).
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thing seems to be there and in place, and in terms of party politics
it doesn't seem to be that much of an issue. I say that simply as a
person reading newspapers, and looking to see what the opposition
says about the Act. My impression at the time of the recent leadership convention of Canada's opposition, the Conservative Party,
was that for most of the candidates for leadership of that party, the
Foreign Investment Review Act was an accepted thing. There were
certain comments made about how the administration of the Act
might in various respects be refined, improved, or taken in certain
directions, but, on the whole, my impression was that the Act was
accepted by them. In that sense, it seems to me to have been removed from party political concerns in Canada. A different area is
what foreign reactions are to the Act, and Mr. Clark will now discuss
those reactions to the Act.
MR. CLARK: I would just like to add a footnote to what Mr.
Spence has said. In associating myself with his remarks, I think the
key element is the significance to Canada. If the situation you postulated were to develop, where in fact the flow of investment capital
were to dry up, this would obviously cause a ripple effect and create
problems in Canada. Clearly then the question would be asked
whether the opening of the door to wider foreign investment would
benefit Canada, and, if this were the case, then it would be allowed.
So obviously, the trigger mechanism is already built in to take that
kind of situation into account.
Second, I think it is fair to say that the whole framework and
scope of operation of the Foreign Investment Review Act is something which is kept in constant review. I would think that after two
or three years of operation, and certainly after five years of operation, the reports that are being put in by Mr. Spence's agency and
interested parties, and the general knowledge accumulated in public, will be taken into account in deciding whether in fact some type
of amendment or additional rules or regulations, or a relaxation of
some of the existing rules or regulations should be considered.
MR. SPENCE: I agree with all of that. At the time that Phase
2 was announced, Mr. Gillespie, then the Minister of Industry,
Trade and Commerce, said that it was quite apparent, and I suspect
his words were carefully chosen, that, "We shall continue to need a
great deal more investment in Canada by our friends abroad if we
are to develop our full potential, as this government is determined
to do." 20
20. 119

PARL. DEB.,

H.C. 7712 (Can. 1975) (remarks of Minister Gillespie).
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PROF. BARCELO: I don't wish to suggest that we have exhausted the topic of the Foreign Investment Review Act, but so that
we get some balance in our discussion, I have the pleasure of inviting
myself to make some remarks about Mr. Gadbaw's paper. What I
would like to do is to take the opportunity to stake out a position of
my own on some of the laws he has discussed, and see if I can
persuade him to agree with me. Mr. Gadbaw has given us a very
good review of the international and national laws that apply to
trade between Canada and the United States, and in fact, with
respect to all the trade of the United States, as well as that of
Canada in some respects. The U.S. laws that he has described raise
an issue that seems to me to be a major and important one. He's
mentioned it himself: the issue of the consistency between a commitment· to a liberal trade policy of the United States on the one
hand, and of Canada for that matter since both have the same
commitment, and the set of laws that he has described which have
the effect of allowing domestic producers to protect themselves from
import competition. Is there consistency between this commitment
and these laws?
I would like to divide the laws themselves into two parts. First,
those which apply to all imports into a country, and, in particular,
the escape clause; 21 and second, those which apply only against
what have been called unfair trade practice laws, the most important ones being the antidumping22 and countervailing duties statutes.23 These are laws that exist in roughly the same pattern in
Canada and the United States, so the issue that I am posing seems
to me to apply to both countries.
I'd like to address my remarks primarily to the problem of the
unfair trade practice laws, since I think the issue of consistency
between these laws and a commitment to liberal trade policy is most
difficult and most sharply drawn. The problem becomes essentially
one of defining what we mean by "unfair." If that definition is not
drawn carefully, there is a danger that these laws may be used to
oppose imports into a country which commits no other sin than to
21. Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV, 1974), formerly Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301, 76 Stat. 883.
22. Trade Act of 1974, § 321, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162-64, 170a(3) (Supp. IV, 1974),
amending Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 406-07, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1970).
23. Trade Act of 1974, § 331, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1516 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending Tariff
Act of 1930, §§ 303, 516, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1516 (1970).
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compete effectively with domestic production. My position, and in
a sense my complaint with the Trade Act of 1974, the American
legislation, is not with the changes that it has made. Rather, my
major complaint is with respect to the definitional changes that the
Act did not bring about in the law, changes I believe were necessary.
Let me take up these laws in turn, starting with the antidumping
laws.
We've been told that there is pending in the United States an
antidumping investigation against automobiles which are imported
into the United States from Europe, Japan, and Canada. 24 Now that
case will be successful if two determinations are made: first, that
the price for which those automobiles are being sold in the United
States is lower than the price they are sold for at home, and second,
if it is determined that these low-priced imports are injurious to a
domestic industry in the United States. 25 It's this second test, the
injury test, that seems to me to be critical on this issue of consistency between liberal trade policy and the antidumping laws. The
International Trade Commission of the United States, formerly the
Tariff Commission, has in the past rendered a number of decisions
in which it found "injury" on the basis of very minor market penetration of dumped imports, as low in some cases as one percent, and
the most recent cases seem to me to find injury attributable to
dumped goods where there is a very tenuous causal connection between the dumped goods and the injury experienced by domestic
industry. The question I ask is: what is so offensive, what is so
dangerous about price discrimination that we should be imposing
antidumping duties in cases of that kind?
It seems to me that the only legitimate basis for imposing antidumping duties is to oppose predatory dumping-dumping which
is aimed at driving out domestic competition so that the dumper
monopolizes the domestic market. If that is the only legitimate
basis, then the antidumping laws ought to define the injury necessary, consistent with that purpose. That could be brought about by
having antidumping statutes aimed only at injury to competition as
opposed to injury to competitors-the very test that is used in the
domestic anti-price discrimination laws, like the Robinson-Patman
Act, where, for example, it is stated that price discrimination which
24. The Treasury Department subsequently announced that it was ceasing its investigation. 41 Fed. Reg. 34,982-90 (1976).
25. Trade Act of 1974, § 321(a)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending
Antidumping Act of 1921, § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
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has the effect of injuring or substantially lessening competition, or
tends to create a monopoly, may then be countered. 26 However, the
test is not one of injury to competitors, but one of injury to competition. This change would, I suggest, make an antitrust statute out
of the antidumping law, instead of what I think is a statute which
has protectionist potential in it as it is currently worded. The Trade
Act of 1974 did not make that change. Instead, it made procedural
changes which will, to a small extent, probably encourage a greater
number of antidumping claims.
Now, I would also criticize the Trade Act of 1974 for not adopting the International Antidumping Code, 27 which is an Executive
Agreement entered into by the United States at the end of the
Kennedy Round in 1967, an agreement also entered into by Canada,
and implemented in Canada by changes in the Canadian law. 28 This
agreement does not go far enough, in my opinion, as it does not
make an antitrust statute out of the antidumping laws. It does,
however, at least provide minimum protections against the abuse of
antidumping laws by requiring a showing of material injury and by
requiring a substantial causal connection between the injury and
the dumping. 29 The United States has not brought its law into line
with the International Antidumping Code, and the decisions of the
International Trade Commission have been in conflict with that
Code in the past, and remain so.
In contrast to my view of the antidumping statutes, it seems to
me that in the countervailing duty area, the issue is not ·primarily
one of the injury test, which will surprise those who for a long time
have criticized the U.S. law for not having an injury test with respect to dutiable products. We now know that the 1974 Act includes
an injury test for nondutiable products to keep the U.S. law technically consistent with the GATT which Mr. Gadbaw correctly described. 30 The problem with the countervailing duty area lies with
the definition of the kinds of government subsidies that can be
countervailed against. The definition in the U.S. countervailing
26. Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) .
27. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the International General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, done June 30, 1967, [1968) 4 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (effective
July 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as International Antidumping Code].
28. Anti-dumping Act, CAN. R.Ev. STAT. c. A-15, § 16(4) (1970), which states: "The
Tribunal shall take into account Article VI, paragraph 4(a) of the International Anti-dumping
Code."
29. International Antidumping Code, supra note 27, art. 3.
30. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2), (b)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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duty statute is very broad. It requires that countervailing duties be
imposed against any products which benefit from a bounty or grant,
very broadly phrased, on production or manufacture in the country
of origin, or on export of those products from the exporting country .:u
Now, what do I think should be done with this definition? It
seems to me, first of all, there should be a distinction drawn between
export subsidies and domestic subsidies. With respect to export
subsidies, those being subsidies granted on the export of a product,
importing countries should be allowed to impose countervailing duties, irrespective of injury to their local domestic industry. The reason for that is that export subsidies are, almost without exception,
distortive of economic efficiency, the major objective behind a liberal trade policy. But one cannot say the same thing about domestic
subsidies, those granted on things like production. A domestic subsidy might or might not be distortive of economic efficiency. A domestic subsidy, for example, could be granted to a depressed region
in a country, and if it had the effect of offsetting the extra costs of
establishing· in that depressed region, it would not be distortive of
economic efficiency. There could be other examples of domestic
subsidies which merely offset a prior inefficiency. In this way one
doesn't know from the beginning that a domestic subsidy is distortive of efficiency.
In addition, domestic subsidies are very widespread and
commonplace in modern economies. They are used for what are
generally considered to be legitimate governmental objectives, for
example, public education, public transportation, or, as I mentioned, aid to depressed regions. If countervailing duties are widely
imposed against domestic subsidies, virtually every product traded
in international trade would be subject to a countervailing duty.
I believe that the only solution to the problem is for the trading
nations of the world to enter trade agreements which will regulate
the use of domestic subsidies in areas such as regional subsidies,
with respect to particular industrial sectors, or with respect to aid
to ailing firms. This is not the kind of problem that can be handled
with a statute that broadly allows countervailing duties against
governmental actions in the nature of domestic subsidies.
In general, the United States has applied its countervailing
duty law in a manner consistent with these suggestions. The statute
has been used almost exclusively against export subsidies. But an
31. Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending Tariff
Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
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important exception to this policy occurred in the 1973 decision to
countervail against Michelin tires from Canada which benefited
from a regional aid program for Nova Scotia, where the tire plants
were located. 3 1.1 The Treasury was influenced by Michelin's plans to
export 75 percent of its output to the United States. Still, this seems
to have been merely a spillover effect of a genuine regional aid plan
not designed as a disguised export subsidy, since the subsidies were
not restricted only to manufacturers who promised high exports. An
agreement between Canada and the United States on the proper
use of regional aids would have been a preferable resolution of this
dispute. In the absence of such an agreement, countervailing duties
would seem to have been appropriate only if American tire manufacturers were, or were likely to be, injured by the Michelin tire
imports-a determination not required under the U.S. statute.
Now, let me say one final word about the escape clause, and
then I'll see if I can persuade Mr. Gadbaw. The escape clause is not
an unfair trade practice law; it is recognized, or at least there are
grounds in the GATI to recognize, that a nation may withdraw from
its tariff concessions, where a domestic industry has been seriously
injured. 32 I have no quarrel with that aspect of the escape clause.
The 1974 Act did, however, liberalize the standards for gaining escape clause benefits, 33 and that is somewhat troublesome. There
were very few cases of relief granted under the escape clause and the
adjustment assistance provisions of the 1962 Act. 34 A much stronger
case could be made for liberalizing the adjustment assistance provisions, instead of the escape clause provisions. Adjustment assistance consists of direct government subsidies in the nature of loans,
tax benefits, or technical assistance to individual firms injured by
import competition. That does not involve increased tariffs, which
could give benefits to prosperous firms that are not injured. It does
not involve increased prices to the consumer, nor does it require the
31.1. X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 1018 (1973) . An appeal of
the Commissioner of Customs' decision brought by importers is now pending, Michelin Tire
Corp. v. United States, No. 75-9-02467 (Cust. Ct., filed Oct. 6, 1975).
32. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, art. XIX, 61 Stat. A3
(1948), T.1.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter cited as
GATT].
33. Under the Trade Act of 1974, the increased imports need only be a "substantial
cause" of the injury; they need no longer be the "major factor." Compare Trade Act of 1974,
§ 201(b)(l), (4), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(l), (4) (Supp. IV, 1974), with Trade Expansion Act of
1962, § 301(b)(3), 19 u.s.c. § 1901(b)(3) (1970).
34. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, §§ 311 et seq., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1911 et seq. (1970).
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United States to renege on its tariff concessions and to negotiate
new compensating tariff concessions, which is the scheme in
GATT. 35 All around, the adjustment assistance provisions seem preferable, from a liberal trade perspective, to the escape clause provisions. So, what I would hope and suggest is that a strong preference
be established for adjustment assistance relief in place of escape
clause relief. I think it's too early to determine how the International
Trade Commission, the President, and the Congress will come out
on the question, since each of them has a role under the escape
clause provisions. My hope is that there will emerge a strong preference for adjustment assistance as opposed to escape clause relief.
So, to summarize, my position on antidumping laws is that
they should be transformed into antitrust laws instead of the current, somewhat ambiguously defined, laws that they are. Currently,
antidumping laws are being used in cases where there are no real
threats to competition. Hence, there is a kind of protectionist potential being exercised in the antidumping area. Countervailing duty
laws should be applied against export subsidies without requiring
that injury in the importing country be shown. With respect to
domestic subsidies, the nations of the world should enter into agreements in which they define the limits within which such subsidies
may be used. In the absence of such agreements, countervailing
duties should be allowed against domestic subsidies, but only, in
this case, if injury can be shown. The escape clause ought to be
available for very extreme cases of total industry-wide injury, but a
strong preference should be established for adjustment assistance
relief. Have I been persuasive?
MR. GADBAW: I think you have focused very well on the overall
issues that are involved with regard to some of the particular points
on these particular laws. I would, however, like to make a few comments which I think are important to keep in mind in considering
the difference between the sort of real world that we have and the
ideal world we would like to have. We are in a situation in which,
generally speaking, the U.S. system in regulating trade is an extremely open one. It is one that does have the kinds of built-in
procedures dictated by law, which are the responsibility of the executive branch to administer. And so, to some extent, there are, on
the one hand, provisions oflaw that have been enacted by Congress
in which the Executive does not have much administrative discre35. GAIT, supra note 33, art. XXVIII.
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tion. On the other hand, we also have to address ourselves to the
international situation, in which the practices and systems of other
countries, which impact on U.S. trade, are formal considerations in
the way in which the United States has to conduct itself in regulating its trade. Let me go down the list and perhaps bring to bear some
of these points in each of the areas that you've raised.
In the area of antidumping, I'm not entirely in agreement with
the points you raised regarding the International Antidumping
Code. I believe it is the position of the U.S. Government that we are
in fact parties to this Code, that we are bouno by the Code, and that
our actions are in fact consistent with the Code. It is true that there
is a congressional resolution that says, to the extent that the Code
is inconsistent with U.S. antidumping law, the provisions of U.S.
law shall apply, 36 but I don't believe that we accept the proposition
that we cannot apply the Antidumping Code within the parameters
of the law that we administer. I think it's important to recognize
that we have an international code which is administered and brings
countries together, so that they can try to work out internationally
agreed rules and procedures. This is an important step in the direction of achieving in a coordinated way, the kinds of forward-looking
trade policies that I think we'd all like to see.
To the extent that the system that we now have is not perfect,
I think we at least have some of the institutional provisions for
moving in the direction of an improved system. In the area of countervailing duties, it's important, I think, to note that we are moving
in the direction of a code. The U.S. position is that it's important
to link the problem of countervailing duties, with the problem of
subsidies. Certainly we are criticized for imposing countervailing
duties, and it's said that this is a form of unilateral action restricting
trade.' I think this can be turned around, however. In fact, foreign
countries are subsidizing our taking unilateral acts which are, in
effect, distorting the trade relations between them and other countries. On the specific point raised with regard to regional development agencies, as in the Michelin Tire case, 37 I think that the distinction between a production subsidy and an export subsidy is a
valid one. I'm not sure, however, that it's entirely correct to assume
that production subsidies do not have very distorting effects on
36. Although each chamber introduced a similar resolution, S. Con. Res. 38, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 113 CONG. R.Ec. 20894 (1967), H. Con. Res. 447, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG.
R.Ec. 21174 (1967), no agreement was reached, so there did not result a binding resolution.
37. X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 1018 (1973). An appeal of
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international trade. I think that the position in Michelin Tire was
not that we had a situation in which the subsidy was directed toward offsetting locational costs. Rather, I think that the case may
have involved a situation in which, in fact, the subsidy involved
more than was necessary to offset the locational costs, and that may
have been much more important in our consideration of imposing
subsidies in that case. There have been other cases in which regional
development aids have not been countervailed against. Of course
the considerations which you raised, that is, the percentage of production which was exported, the size of the subsidy and its relation
to overall costs, and the actual relationship of the subsidy to the
difference in locational costs were important.
Finally, in the area of the escape clause, again, I would agree
that adjustment assistance is an important aspect of our approach
to liberalizing trade and to reaping the benefits of comparative advantage by moving out of industries in which we do, in fact, not have
such an advantage. I think that in this respect the 1974 Act did
make an important step forward. Adjustment assistance is not a
very old program; I think it originated in the United States only in
the 1962 Act. 38 It's a program that in the 1974 Act was significantly
expanded, 39 and in which I think we can anticipate more recognition
that this is indeed the more forward-looking way of dealing with
problems of particular industries adjusting to imports.
However, it's also true that in some circumstances, adjustment
assistance simply is not adequate. Where we do take import action,
we have moved to a recognition of the need that this be a temporary
action, and that it be phased out. These are very important steps
in the direction of moving toward a system in which trade is indeed
liberalized, of course, recognizing that we don't have a perfect
world. In an overall framework, the fact that we're focusing on these
particular issues, rather than looking at very general issues such as
the overall level of tariff and trade restrictions, is an indication that
we have indeed come a long way, and I think it's important to
recognize that it is a dynamic situation. Unless we continue to move
forward at the international level to try to find solutions to some of
these particular problems, and continue to work at eliminating
these various trade barriers, there is a great risk that countries will
the Commissioner of Customs' decision brought by importers is now pending, Michelin Tire
Corp. v. United States, No. 75-9-02467 (Cust. Ct., filed Oct. 6, 1975).
38. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, §§ 311 et seq., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1911 et seq. (1970)
(amended 1974).
39. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 221 et seq., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974).
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slide back and lose some of the benefits of liberalized trade that they
now have.
So, to the extent that I can, I share the views that you've expressed. I would add a certain amount of caution and say that it's
terribly difficult in this atmosphere to be overly ambitious, and we
have to move somewhat carefully and cautiously, and with that
caveat, I would agree with many of the points that you've raised.
PROF. BARCEL6: There's a question here.
MR. RUDDY: I've got two questions for Mr. Spence. The first
is really a point of information, and the second is a request for his
comments. You mentioned, in the context of your discussion of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency, various statistics about investment in Canada and I think that raises for somebody like myself a
kind of post hoc ergo propter hoc argument, and in view of Mr.
Connell's comments about the attitude of Irving Trust, for example,
in deciding not to go forward, I was wondering how you would evaluate the effects that the Agency has had in terms of enterprises that
may have been discouraged from making an entry. Just to take the
position of the devil's advocate, could it be argued that this kind of
investment existed not because of, but in spite of, something like
the Foreign Investment Review Agency?
The second question I have is this: I was very interested in your
comments on the undertakings that could be required by the
Agency, the possibility of the undertaking not being fulfilled, and
thus the mergers being rendered nugatory. As a lawyer, and as
somebody who is brought in at that nugatory phase, I believe this
to be a lawyer's nightmare. You've got something analogous to a gift
subject to a condition subsequent, and I would think that, from the
business point of view and from a legal point of view, this would
create a nightmare situation when these things are rendered nugatory. I don't really know how to explain this question, because I'm
hit with a kind of a kaleidoscope of disasters when that nugatory
effect takes place, and I just wondered how you, as a lawyer, and
how other lawyers have reacted to this kind of provision.
MR. SPENCE: I'm not sure I dare take the second question first,
but I'll try. I don't know of anybody who's very comfortable with the
nugatory power. On the other hand, it is, I think, arguable that it
is the most appropriate kind of enforcement power to have. There's
not much point in having whopping penalties. This is not an act
imposed in order to bring funds into the federal coffers from defaulting parties. The nugatory order seems to be consistent with the
intent of the Act, which is that the investments ought to go forward
only where they have been approved, and if they haven't been apPublished by SURFACE, 1977
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proved then they should not be underway in Canada. The nugatory
order is an attempt to implement that.
I agree that when one starts to hypothesize in general terms
about what could be involved, one perceives all sorts of difficulties
on all sides of the thing. I don't know that I can say anything more
until we see a case and see how the thing gets resolved. I'll be
interested to see what reaction the court has to the whole thing. I
think that there will be an onus on the government, when such a
case arises, to submit to the court a very responsible and carefully
devised plan for the enforcement in the particular case which accords as much protection as possible to all of the interests that have
been established. I don't know that I can be more specific than that
on that one, and I might try to dodge the first question entirely by
telling you that I wasn't quite sure which kind of investment it was
that had perhaps occurred, I forget the way you put it-quite independently of the Act, or in spite of the Act, rather than because of
it.
MR. RUDDY: From what you've said and from what I've gathered in looking at Lorne Clark's paper, we get the history of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency, we get the history of various
investments since that time, and we get a percentage of denials, all
of which makes this Agency look very attractive, and indeed it may
very well be functioning as you suggested. But one thing that was
left out, for example, was the amount of investment that may have
been discouraged in the manner suggested by Mr. Connell. This
would have an effect on the statistics quoted.
MR. SPENCE: Well, I agree. I don't think we know about the
transactions that didn't come forward to us, and we don't know,
therefore, how those transactions would change the box score, as I
call it.
MR. RUDDY: I think that answers my question.
MR. CONNELL: Could I interject a point here? This is something that Jon Bischel and I discussed last evening. Although one
never can gauge the disincentive effect that it may have had, for
example on my bank, I did note that U.S. investment has been
lagging worldwide. There was an article in the New York Times just
a few days ago on that. 40 We anticipate that it will also lag this year.
However, in Canada, U.S. investment will be increasing 13 percent.~1 We still find American companies investing in Canada and
cutting back in other portions of the world. I think this shows that
40. Dale, U.S. Investment Abroad Lagging, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1976, at 43, col. 3.
41. Id. cols. 4-5.
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the entrepreneurial zeal of Americans to go into Canada hasn't been
dampened.
PROF. BARCEL6: Are there other questions? Over here.
MR. KOEHLER: I might comment first on U.S. investment in
Canada. Historically, in the last five or six years, investment in
Canada has declined dramatically over what it was in 1955. I would
like Mr. Spence to expand his comments on the potential extraterritorial reach of the Foreign Investment Review Act as it might affect
non-Canadian takeovers of the parent company. Someone hypothesized the takeover of General Motors. I wonder if you could expand
on that?
MR. SPENCE: I think that's the same point that Mr. Connell
raised earlier. I mentioned in my remarks that there's a provision
in the Act which says that a parent corporation is deemed to carry
on the business of its subsidiary. 42 Accordingly, where the shares of
the parent corporation are purchased, that corporation which is
being acquired, which may be a U.S. corporation, may be a corporation anywhere, and the effect of that acquisition of those foreign
shares under the Act, it is argued, is to give rise to a deemed acquisition of the Canadian business which is carried on by the Canadian
subsidiary. That would mean in effect that if control of the U.S.
parent corporation is acquired by someone else, and it has interests
in various places throughout the world, including Canada, then by
reason of the Canadian business enterprise being part of its worldwide operations, that transaction is, to that extent, subject to review
under the Act.
I mentioned earlier that where such transactions are reviewed,
there is really no interest taken in the other arrangements except as
they form part of the information about the prospects for the way
in which the business may be carried on in Canada. The interest is
really only in the Canadian aspect of the deal. I suppose one of the
difficulties that this provision has for investors is that frequently the
Canadian aspect of the transaction is minor, to overstate it, in comparison with the entire package. From the perspective of the purchaser, it may look like the tail is wagging the dog. For that reason
people have frequently suggested that this application of the Act is,
to put it mildly, not a good thing.
However, I think there is a different view that can be taken
from a Canadian perspective, which is that if it is accepted that the
42. Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat. c. 46, § 3 (1973) .
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acquisition of an operating Canadian business is a matter of concern
under the statute, then it's arguable that it should apply whether
that operating business is already part of a multinational network
or happens to be a freestanding or a separate business. I think there
are two views on the thing.
PROF. BARCEL6: We'll take time for one more question, and
then I think we'll have to adjourn.
MR. RussELL: I don't want to ask a question, but rather I'd
like to make a comment along the lines of Mr. Ruddy's remarks. I
think it's uncontested that the creation of the Foreign Investment
Review Agency has dissuaded some foreign investment in Canada.
I would like to observe, perhaps somewhat crudely, that that is the
very purpose of the exercise. The Foreign Investment Review
Agency is not an agency designed to promote investment in Canada.
In fact, its purpose is quite to the contrary. It has been designed to
dissuade those investments in Canada which the Agency deems
undesirable under the criteria of the statute. I suppose the answer
to Mr. Ruddy's question is: yes, there has been some deterrent to
investment in Canada by persons whose situation under the terms
of the Act is very questionable. I suppose that Mr. Spence would feel
that if someone is in a very questionable situation, then that is an
investment that Canada would be better without. If his situation is
ambiguous, I think Mr. Spence's agency would encourage people to
contact the Agency and find out what the law is with respect to
these, confidentially and without the loss of prestige that Mr. Connell referred to.
I would just make one further comment, if I may make a small
criticism, and that is that it strikes me that some of the statistics
the Agency has put forward, with regard to its accomplishments as
to capital that has come into Canada, the number of jobs created,
are somewhat disingenuous in that to a certain extent . . . (MR.
SPENCE: That's the nicest way that's been put.) . . . one could
argue that those statistics would be a lot higher were it not for the
Agency. I think what's really needed is a .statistic which tells people
about investments that were allowed, which increased the number
of jobs over what would have been created had you not had the
effect that you had, and what you have done which increased the
capital investment as opposed to the way it was intended to be
structured, were it not for the effect of your Agency.
PROF. BARCEL6: Thank you.
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